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Abstract 
The end of the Second World War brought a new kind of system and of stability in Europe 
that they never had experienced before. The war, occupation, and postwar European 
institutions transformed Germany profoundly both internally and externally by linking its 
foreign and security policy to multilateral frameworks. The new Germany is not a major 
military power like the old German empire, rather the most powerful civilian, economic and 
political actor that have the capability to influence policies in Europe and beyond without 
employing military power. 
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Background 
        Europe for centuries and perhaps till today continued to be a region of great importance 
to greatly impact the world at large. There had been continued imperial aspiration for the 
domination and subjugation of one another. To that end each European power run to 
command preponderant military might as a means to secure the survival of sovereign states. 
At the heart of this rivalry the most important and powerful actor in the continent had been 
Germany.  
        The virulent nationalism that grow up in Germany and the „distinctiveness of its national 
identity‟ thought to be led to two devastating world wars in the first half of the 20th century 
resulting incalculable damage and destruction both in human and material terms. German 
expansionism in these wars threatened the European balance of power system where it tried 
to subjugate other countries. Given the historical rivalry among European powers, Europe 
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never had long period of peace and stability, and their history is the history of war and violent 
competition. 
The Germans often had hostile relationship with its neighbors leading centuries of 
conflict over various territorial, religious, ideological and identity concerns. The Sonderweg
1
 
(Special path) or the German historical aberration distinguishes Germany from the rest of 
European countries. To achieve its supremacy it tried at different times to control different 
states. The German „special path‟ therefore sows the seeds of its own destruction. In the post 
war period it divided into two, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). Their division along their ideological allies reflected the division of Europe 
into two. 
Such divisions were paradoxically both sources of stability and insecurity in light of 
the ideological rivalries between the two superpowers in w/c the two Germans are frontline 
states. This situation is rightly stated that, 
During the early post war decades GDR-FRG relations were sources of permanent 
insecurity and even presented a temporary danger of war in Europe.
2
 At the same time, the 
very existence of the two German States and their affiliation with different alliances are 
components of stability and are part of the international balance of forces i.e. security in 
Europe.
3
 
Such status quo was considered as a precondition for military and political stability in 
Europe. Under occupation the role of Germany for its affair is undertaken by the occupying 
forces which denied independent foreign and security policy. The period of occupation had 
fundamental impact on FRG which helped to establish a pluralistic security community 
through integrating in to NATO & European Economic Community and other multilateral 
frameworks. Lacking a sense of positive national identity after the war West Germans are 
willing to accept the transfer of sovereignty to intergovernmental institutions if sovereign 
rights to conduct its foreign policy could be secured with in these institutions.
4
 
As a result FRG‟s political and security system has been determined by the West 
integration ever since 1950s where by it accepted restrictions on its independent policy in 
return for the security guarantee of the Alliance (Western). The project of West integration is 
                                                             
1
 See how the German Path and Nationalism is different from other European States in, Ummu Salma Bava‟s, 
West German RealPolitik, Unification, EU & European Security, 1949-1995, Kanishka Publishers, New Delhi. 
2Schmidt,Max, „the Two German States and European security‟ in Stephen Larrabee‟s Ed. the Two German 
States and European Security, pp.112. 
3
 Ibid, pp.119. 
4
 W. Maul & Harnisch, S., „Introduction‟ in Harnisch & Maull (eds.) „Germany as a Civilian Power‟, the 
Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, pp.1. 
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not just an alternative given to FRG but was as part of its rehabilitation. There was a belief 
that European integration would resolve the ancestral enmity and dangerous interstate rivalry 
in the continent. In this regard „the FRG‟s commitment to West integration was a result of the 
need to overcome the historic Franco-German competition for hegemony in Europe and the 
animosities which had resulted from the two world wars‟.5  
Since FRG was a frontline state in the ideological, politico-economic rivalry of the 
East-West block, its security can only be guaranteed by „its integration with NATO and the 
presence of Western troops and weapons (both conventional and nuclear) on its territory‟. 
This was true of fearing soviet dominance and its use of force to extend its sphere of 
influence given the Korean and East European experiences. Thus in military strategic terms 
its integration to the western defense and security arrangement is translated into the end and 
means to effectively defer the adversary, i.e., aimed at containment of Soviet Union.
6
  
In the Bonn Convention of 1954, the three wartime allies France, the United Kingdom 
and the US undertook the contractual obligation to promote the reunification of Germany, 
although this was not materialized until the end of the cold war.
7
 
Now it became clear that FRG deeply integrated to the West, join NATO (1955) 
began looking the US (West) as friends and allies rather than occupiers and branding USSR 
as enemy. It also recognized that its gradual reclaim of full sovereignty and eventual removal 
of all constraints imposed by the occupation can only be attained, if FRG integrated firmly in 
a Western alliance which could serve both to contain Germany and harness its strength to the 
benefit of the common security of the West.
8
 
The difficulty however is that given GDR was controlled by USSR, Westintegration 
seems elusive to achieve German reunification. In Soviet view reunification might be 
possible if Germany were to accept restrictions on her foreign policy, implying withdrawal 
from western alliance and complete neutrality. This idea was rejected by Adenauer, the first 
chancellor of FRG, he rather had a belief that reunification was to be achieved through his 
policy of „reunification from a position of strength‟ (politik der starke).9 This implies reliance 
on military power that could not however likely in view of the past Germany‟s behavior of 
rearmament that caused extensive destructions. Anti militarism was very strong as a result of 
the horrors of the War. Reunification and German security can not be possible in the cold war 
                                                             
5
 Bluth, Christoph, Germany and the Future of European Security, pp.128. 
6
 Salma, Ummu, „United Germany, EU and Changing Pattern of European Security‟ (Theses), pp.197. 
7
 Dean, Jonathan, „Changing Security Dimensions of the Inter-Germany Relationship‟, in Stephen Larrabee ed. 
Ibid, p.156. 
8
 Bluth, pp.6 
9
 Ibid, pp.7 
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framework in unilateral engagement with one bloc. Adenauer‟s policy of unification through 
strength was very dangerous where nuclear parity was vivid between the two superpowers. In 
such a situation military conflict would not leave a chance to survive the two Germans as 
both blocs stationed lethal nuclear war heads in the German soil. Thus the left side of 
political spectrum saw the practical problems of one side engagement, began to advocate 
contacts with the East to reduce tension and preserve peace. A relation with France was also 
critical along with the Atlantic alliance. 
Therefore in the 1960s a new window of relations with the East was embarked 
(Ostpolitik) to avoid the impasse of East-West relations. In the nuclear age power politics 
alone was insufficient to achieve Germany‟s objective. Of course the nuclear stalemate 
created a sort of stability by maintaining the status quo and prevented any movement to 
overcome the division of Europe. 
Multilateralism was seen as a way out to instability. One such measure was the 
establishment of the conference of security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established in 
1975, after the signing of the Helsinki Accord. It is a pan European Security arrangement 
with membership in both blocks intended to regulate East-West conflict by creating 
institutions that would reduce tension. However, it remained ineffective because of 
confrontation between the two blocs and their respective security organizations NATO and 
WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization). 
The practical challenges in the post war period made FRG to play itself a role as a 
guardian of détente and continued to promote cooperative security as the way forward. At the 
same time „a deep aversion to war and militarism had taken root in the West Germany which  
was encouraged and consolidated by the social radicalism of the 1960s and policies of détente 
of the 1970s‟.10 
In sum, the primary feature of European security from 1945-89 was characterized by 
the emergence of a phenomena called the overlay. This is a condition when “great power 
interests dominate a region so heavily that the local pattern of Security relations virtually 
ceases to operate”.
 11
 Obviously the end of the cold war mean the break up of the overly and 
in particular FRG‟s dependence on external security guarantee diminished. 
          West Germany with more than four decades of West integration made it successfully 
get rid of its unilateralist and militarist inclination to effectively socialized and locked in a 
network of international institutions which changed its foreign and security policy. Not only 
                                                             
10
 Ibid, pp.31 
11
 Cited in Ummu Salma Bava‟s, Theses , pp.185  
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that the unified Germany in post cold war period become the driving force behind European 
integration to include all European Countries, politically, economically and military as a 
potential sources of stability the continent. 
 
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
The meaning, nature and concern of security have been evolved significantly with the 
change and fundamental transformation of world politics. Security traditionally was directly 
associated with state security and hence a national concern. And the means to preserve it was 
through the accumulation of hard/ military power. This was the dominant trend till the end of 
the cold war. In such context stability was seen as absence of war. It implies that „lowering 
one‟s probability of defeat by increasing one‟s military power made for greater security‟.12 
But this situation leaves states in a security dilemma. It means that when states arm 
themselves (even for self defense) they weaken the security of neighbors or other states by 
shifting the military balance in their favor. This will compel others states especially neighbors 
to increase their military capabilities to restore equilibrium.
13
 
With the demise of the East-West conflict, much of the debate on the security 
architecture of Europe has stressed the need to go beyond the traditional cold war focus of 
military power and national territorial defense. The concern shifted to new structures and 
relations that avoid real politik approaches to security that would enable to reduce the 
possibilities for new security dilemma that could escalate arms race. There is a clear 
recognition of the real factors of in security and is property observed that, 
The inadequacy of traditional security to cop the changing environment led to a 
comprehensive approach to security theory. The new theory is characterized by high degree 
of unpredictability and incalculability. This has necessitated a holistic concept of the security 
encompassing the non-military aspects such as economic, political and societal sectors from 
where the basic insecurities arise.
14
  
The primacy of securing states through military is substantially minimized and 
security issues are increasingly defused. The non-military aspects like human rights, 
environmental degradation, political stability and democracy, social issues, cultural and 
religious identity and migration are becoming ever more important for security and stability.    
                                                             
12
 Gartner, H. & Adrian Hyde-Price in their (eds). With Erich Deiter, Europe‟s New Security Challenges, 2001. 
p.2. 
13
 Ibid., Robert Jevis said such dilemmas as a situation in which „the means by which states tries to increase it 
security decrease the security of others Cited in the same page. 
14
 Salma, Ummu, ibid, p.198 (Theses). 
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The concept of societal security has been proposed as a means to understand the 
importance of political identity for security particularly ethno national identity.
15
 The societal 
and ethnic dimension is important in the post cold war period especially in view of the most 
mortal ethnic violence and insecurity in the Balkan and Eastern Europe. 
Security now has two dimensions: avoiding war (negative dimension) and building 
peace (its positive dimensions).
16
 
There are several theoretical approaches to the study of security. But for my purpose I 
will take the three dominant approaches which I thought have influential in security areas: 
Realism, liberal institutionalism or in short (institutionalism) and constructivism. Each of 
them has diverse variants so for the sake of clarity I well use them in general. 
Realism – the basic assumption of this theory is that states are the main actors in world 
politics which is characterized by anarchy. In such a situation states are obsessed with power 
and security, conflict and competition and often failed to cooperate even in the face of 
common interests. So in the unforgiving self-help nature of the system the struggle for 
survival is the utmost concern of all states. Security is primarily gained in through power 
politics and military might. Security in this sense is „national security‟. In a multi-polar 
system states can get its security through aligning with powerful actors and maintained 
through balance of power. 
If the system is dominated by hegemony, the dominant power able to impose its will 
on weaker members of the system. „Hegemonic stability‟ theory assumes the existence of a 
regional hegemon able and opt to impose its domination upon weaker members of a region 
and to limit the inherent political anarchy and economic instability of the international 
system.
17
 
Institutionalism – traditional realism is increasingly challenged by liberal institutionalists 
from the 1970s onwards. It accepted many realist assumptions notably the anarchic nature of 
the international system, but rejected its conclusion. They stressed the potential for 
international cooperation especially through multilateralism and institutional integration. 
Their focus on the emergence complex interdependence also led them to highlight the 
importance of economic and political dimension of the international system and thus move 
away from the realist‟s power politics and military force. They argue that in a system 
                                                             
15
 Hyde Price, Adrian, “Beware the Jabberwock!” Security Studies in the 21st century in H.Gartner, A. Hyde-
Price and Erich Reiter eds. Europe‟s New Security Challenge, 2001: 27. 
15
 Ibid. 
 
17
 Cole, Alistair, Franco-German Relations, 2001, pp.25. 
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characterized by complex interdependence military (hard power) was of declining importance 
relative to economic, political and social (soft power) forms of power.
18
 
This encouraged the growing importance of non-military security dimensions and 
accelerated an associated shift from „strategic to security studies‟.19 This has been influential 
in the security studies in Europe which reflected in the debates of multilateralism and 
democratic peace theory. Since Europe is increasingly democratized, a special peace zone is 
establishing so the possibility of conflict among democracies according to Kantian approach 
is absent. States increasingly view one another not as enemies but instead as partners needed 
to secure greater comfort and well being for their home public. Thus, they reject realisms 
pessimism about international institutions. 
Constructivism - Stresses that security cannot be objectively defined without reference to 
inter-subjective perceptions any more than can individual or state interests. Perceptions of 
security and insecurity cannot be divorced from the values, beliefs and identity of the person 
or thing concerned. 
Security must be seen in terms of a reflective interaction between subjective 
perceptions and material structures, between what is observed and what is imagined. Security 
like interests and identities are constructed. They are socially constructed. „An operational 
concept of security must acknowledge the constructed nature of social reality‟.20 
Constructivism shares neo-liberalisms conclusion that cooperation is possible under anarchy 
but offers a very different account of how that outcome emerges. 
The premise that democratic states have not fought each other is shared by 
constructivists. But constructivism could offer a more general account of zones of peace, one 
not limited to democracies.
21
 
In sum constructivists attempt to show that realist assumption of „power politics‟ is 
socially constructed and hence capable of being transformed by human practice. They 
analyze international relations by looking at the goals, threats, fears, cultures, identities and 
other elements of „social reality‟ on the cultural stage as the social constructs of the actors. 
They are more optimistic about progress in international relations than realists who are loyal 
to a purely materialist ontology. 
Social constructivism focuses on the power of ideas in defining the international 
system. The international structure is not only a constraint on state action, but in fact 
                                                             
18
 Cited in Hyde-Price‟s article, pp.30. 
19
 Hyde-Price, ibid. 
20
 Ibid, pp.48. 
21
 Hopf, Ted. „The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory‟, International Security,   1998  
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constitutes state action through constituting the identities and interests of state agents. Yet the 
constructivists criticized because of their ignorance of other factors such as ethnicity, class, 
race or gender. It also forgoes many positivist assumptions. 
In light of such theoretical and conceptual frameworks the nature of European 
security changed dramatically in the post cold war periods as threats of insecurity are 
multiple and defused. Germany identifies its role in Europe as facilitators of interactions and 
integrations, among European States through broadening and deepening interactions. 
Germany‟s role in Europe can best be explained in institutionalists framework and no doubt 
have also several constructivist element influenced it. The realist‟s assumptions although can 
be reflected in some aspects can no longer dominates Germany‟s as well as European 
Security issues. 
 
Reunified Germany as Agents of European Security 
Ever since Germany reunified on October 1990, it along with France played a leading 
role in European Security and integration where external constraints imposed on its 
sovereignty eased with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It marked also the unification of 
Europe as well. It can be said Germany‟s stability and security is directly related to the 
security of Europe. In terms of its behavior the German of the pre-war period was no longer 
existed. And the new Germany comes with new role and responsibility abandoning reliance 
on national security to dependence on supranational institutional security structures. 
The end of the cold war as such does not mean the end of conflict and removal of 
security threats in Europe. Rather displayed new dangers to the continent in the form of 
ethnicity, nationalism, religion and other non-military sources. The greatest sources of danger 
come not from internally but from ex-soviet dominated regions of the continent , i.e., Central, 
Eastern and South Eastern parts of Europe. These states have been mired with social, 
economic and political crisis following the collapse of communism. Since Germany regained 
its location as the heart of Europe, she became more venerable because of its proximity. 
FRG‟s security is no longer threatened by Russian invasion or others, but instead by 
diverse external uncertainties in the post cold war period. The systematic change and its 
unification have forced Germany to redefine its future regional and global role both 
economically and politically and this will naturally affect its security policy.
22
 To offset the 
emerging security challenges both to Germany and Europe, Germany heavily relied on 
                                                             
22
 See Ummu Salma, (Theses), p.203. 
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institutions of Europe through multilateralism and integration that in turn removes the 
suspicion of United Germany as a potential threat to the continent, a fear shared by many 
European countries following its reunification. 
For Germany the European Union (EU) constitute the core of the Western peace 
community in which with France always advocated an Europe strong, united, both 
economically, politically and military as the only guarantee for establishing peace and 
security on the continent.
23
 Its uninterrupted and explicit support for EU institutions entails 
that Germany is ready to transfer its sovereignty to supranational European institutions and 
determined towards political union. 
The new Germany is interlocked with multiple networks of regional and international 
institutions as well as domestic constraints. 
Domestically the basic law of Germany curbed expansive unilateral security policy. 
Article 26 of the Basic Law declares unconstitutional any activities apt or intended to disturb 
peaceful international relations, especially preparation for military aggression‟. Article 24 
permits the government „with the view to maintaining peace‟ to „become a party to a system 
of collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations on its sovereign powers 
as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations 
of the world‟. Article 23 which was completely revised after unification states that „with a 
view to establishing a United Europe the FRG shall participate in the development of the EU 
… To this end the federation may transfer sovereign powers by law with the consent of the 
Bundesrat‟. Article 87 authorizes the federal government to establish armed forces for 
defense purpose.
24
 
The above mentioned articles are clearly constraining German Foreign and Security 
policy in providing legal grounds in the form of permitting its involvement in multilateral 
security institutions as well as curbing its ambition of unilateral aggressive foreign and 
security policy. 
The political culture of the German society has also been changed in fundamental 
ways as a result of decades of occupation and rehabilitation programmes. That behavior 
continued to dominate the post unification German identity. In this respect, Duffield pointed 
out that; 
                                                             
23
 Ibid, pp.182. 
24
 Duffield, Johns, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security 
Policy after Unification. pp.60 
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In the post war period, German society as a whole and German political elites in 
particular can be characterized as possessing distinctive, widely shared and rather elaborated 
set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to national security policy, which were 
little altered by unification …. These attitudes are shaped primarily by two sets of historical 
experiences of the Nazi dictatorship and world war second. These events discredited much of 
Germany‟s previous political culture and increased German receptiveness to alternative 
beliefs and values, creating a situation in which a new political culture could take root.
25
 
The negative historical memories they had, therefore, will continue to shape their 
political culture both in present and of the future. 
 
Integration as a means to European Security 
The Unified Germany has the third largest economy in the World and the first in 
Europe with largest population. As a geocentre of Europe and neighbored by Stable 
democracies of the West and unstable post communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, 
its strategic goal in Foreign and Security policy is based on strong interest in deep and 
extending integration. Its very location exposed to the dangers of instability in its eastern 
frontier. As the cold war subsidies the traditional west integration policy has been 
increasingly matched by interests to expand integrated economic and security structures 
eastward. Undoubtedly the Unified Germany is the most beneficial in the post war 
arrangements, now interested in achieving integrated and stable Europe from the Atlantic to 
East of Russia based on plural democracy, stable political cooperation and market economies. 
This outstanding interest in the enlargement of integration is deeply rooted in the constants of 
Germany‟s strategic pattern: a centered European location, many neighbors, economic 
capability, dependence on foreign trade and exchange as well as the moral burden of the 
nation‟s past, positive experiences of integration and negative experiences with “special 
paths”.26 
Integration move is beneficial not only for Germany but also for its partners as well. 
„Only through integration can Germany‟s critical size be self-beneficial and benefit its 
neighbors‟.27 Thus, Germany is aware of its importance and considered its unity and 
European unification as two sides of the same coin, i.e., inseparable, hence committed in the 
processes. From the German perspective, the EU is a basis for a pan European order and an 
                                                             
25
 Ibid., p.61. 
26
 Giessmann, Hans J., “The Cocooned Giant”, Germany and European Security, 1999. 
27
 Frenkler, Ulf, „Germany at Maastricht: Power Politics or Civilian Power?‟ in „Germany as Civilian Power?‟ 
pp.26 
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„anchor of stability‟ has fundamental importance for the peaceful development of the whole 
continent which get consistent German support for its enlargement.
28
 
Germany supported peaceful changes and has a strong aversion to the use of force 
because of the hard experiences of the previous wars. Multilateralism and institutionalism is 
the immutable foundation to its foreign and security policy. At times even sacrifice its vital 
interest for the sake of Europeanization. The threats now particularly from its eastern side 
includes political turmoil, economic collapse, ethnic conflict, nationalism and environmental 
degradation caused by socialism would eventually spill over into Germany via civil war or 
mass migration. 
Its deep concern for stability in Eastern Europe has not doubt go beyond self-interest. 
Since the nature of security is dynamic, sources of instability and conflict are multiple and 
defused largely of non-military, no country will remain unaffected. So each countries security 
is interdependent. 
For the purpose of stability in the region Germany strongly defended the accession of 
central and Eastern European countries (CEE) to various institutions of the West including 
the EU, NATO, WEU (West European Union) etc. Apart from this Germany provided huge 
generous financial and economic support to CEE countries including Russia in order to 
facilitate peaceful transition. Such deliberate deployment of financial resources to bring about 
change and political stability has become know as „Chequebook diplomacy‟.29 Volker Ruhe, 
former defense minister of Germany once rightly said, „if we don‟t export stability, we will 
import instability‟. 
 On accounts of its economic influence, Germany performs the most important role in 
the EU and has major external influence on the new democracies of central and Eastern 
Europe because of its trade relations which have the largest share.  
 One of the most powerful resources that helped Germany for its success in integration 
derives is that Germany is considered as „Civilian power‟. Civilian power replaces the 
military enforcement of rules (politics base on power) with the internationalization of socially 
accepted norms (politics based on legitimacy). According to Harnisch and Maull, although it 
has several distinct roles three norms have proven essential for a civilian power role 
concept.
30
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 Ibid, pp.36 
29
 Bluth, Ibid, pp. 152 
30
 Harnish, Sebastian & Hanns W. Maull, Ibid. P. 4 
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First, the willingness and ability to civilize international relations including promoter 
or initiator of international action. Second, the willingness to transfer sovereignty or 
autonomy to supranational  institutions as a promote of collective Security and opponent of 
unilateral actions; and Third, the eagerness to realize a civilized international order even if it 
implies to forego short term national interests (power or plenty) 
This civilian power role property fits to the unified Germany‟s foreign and security 
policy as we have already seen earlier because Germany is relying primarily on non-military 
instruments, supporting democratization, even willing to relinquish sovereignty if it promotes 
common interests and heavy dependence on multilateralism and institutionalism. 
Its civilian power role creates credibility to Germany in view of some suspicions that 
the unified Germany may took inward and follow the renationalization of its foreign and 
security policy. By and large Germany was successful in its policy towards the CEE 
countries. 
 
Unified Germany’s Contribution in Strengthening 
European Security Institutions 
Norms and values of national political culture of Germany evolved profoundly over 
the past five decade. Its post war security policy of regional and international institutional 
allegiance shows remarkable continuity after unification. It continued working on political 
union that includes the development of common foreign and security policy, Economic and 
monetary union, widening EU to include CEE countries.  
With the end of the cold war Germany‟s dependence on Superpower military 
protection is weakened with clear reduction of threats especially of invasion. At the same 
time its interest in regional stability rises. Germany used multilateral institutional both 
regional and global, to advance its interests. It looked Europeanization as a solution for its 
particular strategic dilemma. A strong common foreign and security policy would allow 
Germany to escape from its foreign policy dilemma either to take a low profile (the „political 
pigmy‟) or conduct a „Gaullist‟ foreign policy and revive old minorities.31 The latter 
obviously is out of Germany‟s currency of power now.  
The security policy now focus on maintaining and strengthening Europe‟s  post cold 
war security institutions like CSCE/OSCE, NATO, WEU, EU and some bilateral 
arrangements. In addition to that promotion of arms control, disarmament and non-
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 Cole, Alistair , Ibid, p.110-111 
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proliferation has constituted a central objective of German security policy after unification. 
So it destined to play important role in the formation of a common European security and 
defense identity (ESDI) based on EU & the WEU. 
The Maastricht summit of 1991 accorded CFSP as the second pillar of the EU (pillar 
one-the European community, pillar two-the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and pillar three, cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)). This treaty for the first time 
attributed a treaty based role to the EU in security policy.
32
 Germany and France strongly 
advocated in favor of strong European role in security matters, Germany however is also 
keen to avoid any potential conflict with the US about the future Euro-Atlantic alliance. On 
the Atlantic alliance the two countries has divergent strategic heritage where France is against 
stronger US involvement in the European sphere. Whereas Germany stressed the inseparable 
twining of European integration and Atlanticism 
European integration needs a CFSP that would eventually helped in the establishment 
of a common defense policy though not yet moving head. Common Defense is also proposed 
by Germany to be the fourth pillar of EU. 
 
European Union- For Germany it embodies at best a functioning economic and peace order 
even without providing a hared military defense and peace order for its member states.
33
 
European integration provided a moral framework which Germany could develop its identity 
as a member of international society on the basis of rejection of militarism and nationalism 
that led to disaster. The EU as a base for European security order would contribute in 
searching for a common ground in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. It 
should also develop a coherent security posture which will cover the whole range of 
nonmilitary and if required also of military means.  
 
West European Union- It performs only minor roles in European security. For long it has 
been overshadowed by the predominant role of NATO in western defense during the cold 
war. It has no direct link with the EC. So Mitterrand (French President) and Kohl (Chancellor 
Germany) proposed a link between WEU and European political union with greater 
operational capabilities to become part and parcel of the EU. 
 Germany supported the absorption of WEU by the EU. Defense would become the 
Fourth pillar of the EU. This would mean that defense policy would be coordinated at the 
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European level and decisions could be made by qualified majority. All member State of EU 
would have to become full membership Of the WEU (All EU members are not full members 
the WEU).
34
  
 However, this common defense would not mean the creation of a common European 
army or loss of control over national armed forces, Members of WEU can abstain from joint 
military actions. It was seen as the defense arm of the EU. The Maastricht Treaty had 
established a legal link between the two. It has been seen as a means to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
  
Conference for security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE)- It was established in the high 
time of the cold war to be the cornerstone of European security order. It is inclusive & pan-
European in nature. With the end of the cold ear CSCE transformed in to an organization 
(OSCE) and transcend the original function of settling and mediating roles to adopting 
operational conflict prevention and crisis management. Yet it failed to perform its functions 
given weak legal basis. None the les it could not be underestimated particularly in the 
operational field of democracy building ,preventive diplomacy that include early warning of 
conflicts and the deepening of collective security structures. German support for the OSC 
after unification is largely to overcome Russian opposition to NATO enlargement.
35
  
 With regard to NATO, Germany give special attention unlike France which is against 
US dominated NATO. Despite the proliferation of diverse security institutions in Europe, 
none of them are truly functioning and have the capacity to address real security challenges 
effectively. In the absence of such security institutions that are capable of enforcing both non-
military and if necessary also military means make NATO remain the only credible security 
instrument and hence they give continued support for its existence.  
 Germany and Britain wanted the US presence in Europe. So NATO provides a legal 
and institutional framework for the military presence of the US in Europe which saw it as 
essential for the security and stability of the continent even supported by most European 
nations whether or not member of the Alliance. That is because only the US had the means 
and capability at hand to provide sufficient protection for Western Europe. From the German 
perspective this will allow neighbors to feel more comfortable with the new and larger 
Germany. 
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 NATO expansion at the beginning was opposed strongly by political parties 
domestically like social democrats, and Greens apart from Russia the main external actor 
opposing its enlargement. Partnership for Peace (PFP) was devised to address the security 
concerns of Germany and its CEE neighbors. It did not involve however, the extension of 
security guarantees but designed as preparation for membership. It was offered to all 
members of the OSCE, and thus clearly would involve states that would not be offered 
NATO membership at an early (or any) stage.
36
  They can participate in many of its activities. 
Domestic opposition gradually lost ground and Russia‟s position is ambivalent in NATO 
expansion in some cases. 
 Eurocorps is another security arrangement established by France and Germany. It 
becomes operational in 1995 with troops drawn from France, Germany, Germany, Belgium, 
Spain and Luxemburg. Germany policy maker presented Eurocorps as part of a 
Europeanization of NATO and as a means of pulling back France to NATO orbit while 
promoting a more autonomous European defense capacity. Eurocorps would opened to other 
Europeans states and could form the basis of a multinational, European corps. It is subject to 
French-German Security Council and is administered by WEU planning cell.
37
  
 However its precise relations with other security organizations were left ambiguous. 
Yet it was intended to provide international institutional framework in which the 
constitutional and political limitations of German participation in out of area mission 
gradually overcome by a network of commitments. Its demand to draw France closer to 
NATO was finally fulfilled by the French decision to rejoin NATO military committee in 
December 1995. The Franco-German relationship could mitigate the effect of European 
division. 
 
The Evolving shift of German security policy 
We have seen that the military dimension of security after the cold war has been less 
emphasized. However its necessity since unification grows as a result of events in the 1990s. 
 So security policies continued to be ultimately concerned with violence, the use of 
force and their possible consequences due to military conflicts, ethnic cleaning, violent 
dislocation of people, genocide and human right abuses in eastern and south eastern parts of 
Europe in some ways that can not be addressed with out the use of force. 
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 Most German leader and the public at large are reluctant to see their country assume a 
leadership role in international affairs especially regarding security even with in multilateral 
institutions. Yet since 1990s we see also a progressive change in the attitude of German‟s 
towards security issues. So the political culture may change gradually overtime and even on 
rare occasions sharply.
38
  
 Thus the events of the 90s profoundly affected the German public‟s regarding the use 
of force. Despite the post war which sufficiently socialized FRG into the Western liberal 
camp and altered its militaristic behavior, in military areas in particular important changes are 
taking place. This change however continued to be under strict European and international 
institutional restrictions. 
Initial abstention and reluctance to use force was because the basic law did not allow 
out of area operation (outside of NATO area). This coupled with bitter resentment of the use 
of force by the people and reluctance of its leaders kept Germany not to focus on the military, 
only to have limited army for limited purpose. So that it can‟t play a leading role in this 
sphere which means that its credibility for joint enforcement is questionable. 
Even if there are clear provisions, Germany was not willing to take the lead, rather 
maintain low profile, and shoulder the responsibility to its partners and institutions like the 
European and Atlantic alliance. Germany is also staunch supporter of NATO along with the 
strengthening of ESDI. This helped to persist US-German Security compact in which, 
Germany was a security consumer, though the extent to which it consumed security 
has declined because it was no longer a frontline state the way Federal Republic had been and 
because no nuclear security issue become increasingly important.
39
 
Germany now learned that the new Europe has facing challenges that made soft 
power perspective alone meaningless. New demands and risks are to be taken into 
consideration. The constitutional court decided in June 1994 that military action beyond self-
defense (according to Article 87) was in fact consistent with the constitution presumably if 
taken under the norm of Article 24, and if in each single case a supportive majority of elected 
representatives to the Bundestag has voted for action.
40
 So the opposition of left leaning 
parties and the Greens gradually subsidies as German participation in peace keeping and 
peace enforcement according to Chapter VII of the UN and Article 24 of Basic law could be 
conceivable task for political and also for moral reasons. 
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We see therefore remarkable change in public opinion regarding the use of force 
inline with party positions. It implies also the widening of support for the strengthening of the 
army/ Bendeswehr. Thus, we see total abstention in the case of Gulf war concerning out of 
area operation has shifted to limited engagement in Somalia and the enforcement of the 
Yugoslav embargo to the participation in NATO stabilization and implementation force in 
Bosnia under a UN mandate and recently to engagement in NATO‟s war against Yugoslavia 
to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo whose legal basis is unclear.
41
 
Pressure on Germany to play a greater role in world politics grew in the aftermath of 
the Gulf War I. The demand to develop a CFSP in Europe lacked credibility if Germany itself 
was constitutionally unable to participate. So the July 1994 court decision will avoid such 
obstacles and Germany need to play a role commensurate with its economic and political 
power. 
The Bosnian massacre had a greater repercussion for the support of armed 
intervention and led to the reconsideration of the German‟s traditional position, not only 
among almost all political parties but also the public at large. Military operations have 
become broadly accepted as a means of last resort.
42
 
The fear of German Unification to be the most dominant and assertive power in 
Europe as well as in the world led some states oppose its reunification like Britain, France, 
Israel among others. The fear of German hegemony, remilitarization and re-nationalization of 
FSP (Foreign and Security Policy) has proven to be not true. On the contrary Germany was 
unwilling or utmost impotent to contribute militarily for its allies because of less emphasis 
given to its military. The surprising thing is that the US and Israel among others condemned 
Germany for not contributing military against Iraq in the first Gulf War.
43
 
Not only the allies but also other nations even the UN demand a more assertive role 
from Germany, a willingness to play powers „positively‟. That is to assume power with 
responsibility. Still f most Germans want power to be remained soft or civilian. 
For the first time since the Second World War Germany was involved in its first war 
in Kosovo. It started to act like other states and is a clear recognition that non-military means 
can not always achieve the intended target unless backed by military enforcement. Its 
assertiveness is circumscribed by different institutions and circumstances. Germany‟s 
principle of „never alone‟ (reliable partner of the western alliance and multi literalist) and 
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„never again‟ (never again war originating from the German Soil) is a stumbling block for its 
security policy. 
For instance in the Kosovo crisis Germany wanted a cooperative multilateral 
approach including Russia and China, International legitimacy through the UNSC Resolution 
and stabilizing the whole of South East Europe through a comprehensive approach. This is 
because without involving influential actors in that region it will not bring the intended target 
with least cost both in material and human terms. A stability pact was proposed by Germany 
intended to dissolve intra and inter state conflicts through socio-economic development, 
democratization, regional cooperation and integration; and its ultimate incentive is the 
promise of membership for the South East European countries in the EU and NATO.
44
 
Here we observe that Germany continued to adhere to its institutionalist and 
multilateralist credentials, and its concern for the possible damage to the credibility and 
effectiveness of regional and international institutions, as had been seen in Bosnia, if it is not 
adequately controlled led Germany to involve militarily. German had also a fear that if the 
Kosovo conflict continued unchecked, refugees will overflow her, given that Germany is the 
favorite destination for refuges, and asylum seekers in Europe. 
The Yugoslav crisis proved that Germany did have an important role as a major 
regional power. It forced a reappraisal of the diplomatic, economic and military instruments 
at Germany‟s disposal and how they could be employed. Most importantly it proved the 
political context in which a fundamental review of force could be accepted. 
One of the enduring legacies of the Yugoslav conflicts therefore is that the 
„normalization‟ which the German political elites were calling at the end of 1980s has been 
achieved finally.
45
 
The basic elements of Germany‟s institutionalist security policy are proved to be very 
successful. Germany‟s new role in the post cold war period as a „civilian power‟ come to 
recognize and realize that collective security demands the use of force. 
 
Conclusion 
What comes in the post war period in Europe and the situation after the recession of 
the cold war is that European security and German security is intimately inseparable. The 
cold war could be seen as the main training ground in rehabilitating and reshaping Germany‟s 
behavior from the unilateralist, militarist negative nationalism of the past. It changed 
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Germany successfully as the most credible ally of the west and staunch supporter of a liberal 
democratic values and norms. Along with changes in its political culture, the historical 
hostility between France and Germany has adequately resolved through bilateral and 
multilateral relations especially in security cooperation. Reconciling the two states were 
tantamount to establishing stability in the continent. Similar kind of cooperation and 
agreement has been entered with its historic enemy in the east, Poland. It means that 
Germany is now surrounded by friends and allies which strengthened further deepening and 
expansion of European integration. 
Germany along with its allies want to establish integrated and stable Europe, a Europe 
that no longer threatened by its assertiveness. As a result the national „special path‟ has to be 
avoided at any cost. Security threats are primarily driven from economic, political, social, 
ethnic, religious, environmental and immigration than military one. Germany no longer wants 
to militarize itself nor ambition to have destructive weapons including biological and nuclear 
arsenals. Now as a „normal state‟ eased from cold war restraint on its sovereignty, 
multilateralism and institutionalism continued to be the immutable foundations, a remarkable 
continuity of the post war legacies. The trauma of an „eternal German Question‟ for Europe 
to be the most striking trouble spot forever has been proved to be a myth. 
Since it commands substantial amount of power in terms of economic, political as 
well as military potentials, it need to play a leading role with strict adherence to 
multilateralism and institutional norms in a positive manner. Despite diverse European 
security arrangements, the Europeans are not able or often not willing to deal collectively in 
crisis situation. The CFSP has been never realized because it is very difficult to reconcile the 
national interests of all members of the community. Hence they are unwilling to invest even 
in the most available institutional framework like OSCE. 
The Political and military turmoil‟s of the 1990s shows the fact that a European 
moving towards political, monetary and economic union need to be supplemented by 
coordinated functioning military integration, though it may not be an easy task. EU is still far 
away from posing as a credible alternative to NATO for all eventualities. As long as members 
do not overcome their present predicaments and start to speak with one voice particularly in 
crisis situation they will hardly achieve a common ground for ESDI. 
No single approach can exactly explain the fact of the post reunification German 
behavior regarding foreign and security policy. Obviously the realist assumption can not fit 
properly to the new Germany role. Realists anticipation of a change in the structure of power 
following the end of cold war would encouraged diplomatic unilateralism, reliance on force 
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and re-nationalization of  FSP(foreign and security policy) is far from reality and not 
conformed with the new Germany‟s role. 
It is most probably be best explained by liberal institutionalists that dominated the 
unified Germany‟s FSP discourses. For instance, its enlargement policies, insistence on 
legitimacy through regional and international institutions for a given action, multilateralism 
which it calls frequently are some of the manifestations. Many constructivist ideas also 
influenced the new German Identity. Its involvement in international crisis is now 
increasingly shaped by norms and firmly held beliefs rather than by material interests. 
Intervention in Kosovo crisis was the best example. Its institutionalist approach strengthened 
more after unification. It is used to pursue its national interests with in a supranational 
framework to avoid any bad memories of the past.  
Since state security is interconnected continent wide, state security as a national issue 
can no longer be obtained for any state acting on its own. Security issues and threats are 
multidimensional which needs cooperative effort transcending national boundaries. To that 
effect the state must be willing and committed to the institutions of collective security like 
OSCE by giving appropriate powers. The united Germany no more wanted to be a military 
hegemony, if not economic and political. 
Its civilian power status coupled with strong economic and liberal democratic values 
serve as a „snowballing‟ effect for CEE countries that they saw Germany as their model and 
tried to imitate her. Germany and Western Europe not only democratically tamed but also 
institutionally harnessed. Constructivism reflects Germany‟s firm commitment to 
institutionally based solutions and its civilian power status. External variables are more 
influential in shaping and changing national security culture. The present and future roles of 
Germany is inextricably linked to its past. The civilian power role for long circumscribed 
military commitments and seek to avoid the costs of military force. 
  The transcontinental chain of cooperation is unprecedented and accounted to the 
Germans role in shaping the continent. It also interested in expanding east-west contact, 
sustain close ties with in the EU and keeping transatlantic ties that indicates the return of 
German influence in the continent. The feeling of exercising power with responsibility is 
recognized. Germany should no longer rule out the possibility of military operations for the 
common security of the continent. There are clear signs of German adaptation of FSP to a 
new different environment while maintaining the norms and principles governing that policy. 
The traditional saying of Germany as an “economic giant but a political dwarf” will no longer 
explain the unified Germany. Undoubtedly today it is the most powerful actor politically, 
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economically and militarily in the continent. Even internationally its power is recognized for 
instance, Germay mostly invited by the five veto powers to discuss issues of international 
concern is one of its prominences. For effective continental security organization important 
actors like Russia has to be participated without which security in the volatile region of CEE 
would be impossible. 
Germany‟s attitude towards war and conflict suggests that despite being more 
assertive and influential remains firmly in the west. The foreign policy identity of the new 
Germany willing to use force only in „moral‟ circumstances and only as part of an 
international alliance with legal sanction and in support of international law is indicative of 
what one would expect from a state with a post sovereign identity. Indeed it follows a 
Kantian approach to European peace and stability. The new European order was to be built 
domestically on democratic institutions throughout the continent and regionally a close 
economic interdependence, prosperity, vibrant international organizations and the rule of law. 
The stability pact proposed by Germany during the Kosovo war substantiates this idea. In 
such away the possibilities of military conflict among European democracies become 
unthinkable. Germany‟s integration through widening and deepening derive of the EU and 
other institutions would further expand the pacific zone. Despite the progressive change of 
Germany‟s behavior regarding the use of force, it will continue to remain contentious as the 
culture of restraint is deeply entrenched. 
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